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Minimum Wages and Occupational Skills Acquired During High School 
1. Introduction  
Training is important for even low-skilled jobs.  Sommers and Morisi (2012) found that 
only 30 of 446 occupations open to individuals with no more than a high school education 
required no training.  Consequently, almost all jobs that would employ high school students will 
involve some firm investments in training, and that training is likely to be expensive.1  The 
training may have only a transitory effect on earnings, but many papers have shown that working 
in high school can have a significant effect on earnings years afterward (Ruhm, 1997;  Light, 
2001; Neumark and Nizalova, 2007; and Baum and Ruhm, 2016).  A plausible assumption is that 
job training completed while in high school can have permanent effects on lifetime earnings. 
If true, then government policies that reduce access to training can have long-term 
adverse consequences for lifetime earnings, while policies that increase training provision would 
have positive effects.  Becker (1964) argued that minimum wages lower firm provision of 
training.  Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999) presented conditions under which minimum 
wages would increase firm provision of training.  This study will examine which of the scenarios 
holds, using public and restricted geocode data obtained from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth 1997 (NLSY97).   
The novelty of this study lies in its use of the recently developed O*NET database2 
which allows us to convert information on occupations held by high school students into the 
implied on-the-job training acquired while in high school.  This in turn allows us to assess how 
minimum wages, truancy laws, and local labor market conditions affect the types of jobs offered 
to high school students and the implied job skills attached to those jobs. We also test whether 
                                                 
1 Firms spend 4.3% of their payroll on direct training, averaging $1,273 per worker  (ATD, 2017).   
2 The O*NET Resource Center has detailed information on the database development including 277 descriptors for 
each of 974 occupations. See http://www.onetcenter.org/overview.html 
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these job skills acquired in high school have effects on adult incomes, wages, and occupational 
skills as suggested by the past studies linking high school employment with subsequent labor 
market earnings. 
Our results strongly support Becker’s (1964) prediction that minimum wages will lower 
the provision of training.  The mechanism is not from loss of employment: there is no significant 
difference in high school employment in high versus low minimum wage states.  Instead, firms 
alter the types of jobs they offer high school students in high minimum wage states so that the 
filled jobs involve less training.  We also show that training in high school persists to raise 
income, wages, employment and skills as the students age.   
Our estimated impact of the minimum wage on adult training and income is modest 
because students have many years to acquire the training they did not receive in high school.  
The main avenue for making up for lost job training in high school is through additional 
schooling in college.  Consequently, the students most adversely affected by the lost job training 
opportunities in high school are those who do not go on to college. 
We open the discussion with a review of the literature on the effects of minimum wages 
on training.  We then present a model based on Acemoglu and Pischke (2003) that provides the 
Becker and Acemoglu-Pischke models as special cases.  We use that theory to motivate the data 
and estimation that follows. 
2. Literature Review 
 
Few issues in economics have been investigated more intensively than the effect of 
minimum wages on employment.3 And yet recent studies continue to generate incongruent 
results. Recent highly cited studies of the impacts of rising minimum wages include Giuliano 
                                                 




(2013) who report an increase in teenage employment, Allegretto et al. (2011) who report no 
significant effects, and Neumark et al., (2014) and Meer and West (2016) who both report 
modest decreases. One source of imprecision in the estimated employment effects is the small 
fraction of workers for whom the minimum wage binds. Until recent increases in the passage of 
state minimum wages, there was little variation in the minimum wage over time or in cross-
section, and the minimum wage was binding for only a small fraction of the labor market (Autor 
et al., 2016). Moreover, most of the prominent analysis occurs at the aggregated level which 
combines workers below and above the new minimum wage thresholds. Because we would 
expect firms to be substituting away from the subminimum workers toward higher skilled super-
minimum workers, the net employment effect combines workers whose employment should be 
falling with those experiencing rising demand in response to the new minimum. This conflation 
suggests that the use of aggregated employment data biases downward the estimated 
employment response. To the extent that any consensus exists, it is that minimum wages likely 
have small negative effects on low-skill employment at the levels of minimum wages 
implemented (Neumark and Wascher, 2008).4 
Less attention has been paid to other responses to rising minimum wages. One recent area 
of exploration has been the role of minimum wages on worker flows. It appears that minimum 
wages reduce both the rate of separations and new hires (Brochu and Green, 2013; Dube et al., 
2016; Gittings et al., 2016. The resulting decreasing churning rate in the labor market would be 
expected to lower the rate of productivity growth – fewer potentially rewarding matches will be 
tried (Pries and Rogerson, 2005; Davis and Haltiwanger, 2014; Lazear and McCue, 2017). 5 In 
                                                 
4 Recent implementation of substantially higher minimum wages in some cities will offer a better environment in 
which to test effects. 
5 Churning rate is defined as the sum of the separation rate plus the hiring rate beyond that necessary to meet the 
needs of job creation and destruction. 
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addition, the cost of a replacement hire rises, so firms may have an incentive to retain a worker in 
what otherwise would have been a bad match. However, the average quality of matches rises 
because less-skilled workers are priced out of the market. 
A potential productivity gain from the minimum wage occurs if it increases training. In 
the Becker (1964) formulation, minimum wages make it more expensive for a firm to invest in 
training. On the other hand, higher minimum wages can raise the opportunity cost of time spent 
in schooling or other forms of general training. In addition, the lower hiring rate of less-skilled 
workers and the possible higher return if hired may induce more low-skilled workers to invest in 
their own skills (Cahuc and Michel, 1996; Flinn and Mullins, 2015). Firms may even have an 
enhanced incentive to provide training if the lower probability of separations induced by the 
minimum wage (or other labor market frictions) that reduce turnover encourage firms to make 
investments in training. These incentives arise from a firm’s ability to capture rents from the 
worker’s improved skill set (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 1999).  
 Empirical evidence on the impact of the minimum wage on training is mixed. Mattila 
(1982) found positive effects of minimum wages on college but not high school education. Flinn 
and Mullins (2015) provide supporting evidence based on estimates from their structural model 
of job search and schooling decisions. Conflicting evidence was reported by Neumark and 
Nizalova (2007) who found that high school graduates in high minimum wage states were less 
likely to pursue a college degree. 
The limited evidence on the effects of minimum wages on firm provision of training also 
lacks consensus. Barron et al. (1989, 1999) showed that firms paid the majority of the cost of 
training that occurred within the firm, and they estimated that training costs comprise about 4% 
of the annual wage bill (ADP, 2017). Using samples of employees or firms, Grossburg and 
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Sicilian (1999) and Fairris and Pedace (2004) find no impacts of minimum wages on training, 
while Arulampalan et al. (2004) find positive effects. However, reliance on samples of 
employees or firms can bias results since the analyses focus on impacts only among those who 
successfully found and retained employment. Acemoglu and Pischke (2003) find small negative 
effects in a sample that focuses on youth most likely to be affected by the minimum wage. 
Bellman et al. (2017) examine training provided in German establishments that vary in the 
number of minimum wage workers they employ. They find that firms with higher shares of 
minimum wage workers are less likely to train. However, firms are selecting whom to hire and 
whom to train, so the exposure to minimum wage workers is endogenous to the training decision. 
Neumark and Wascher (2001) did find evidence that young workers receive less firm-provided 
formal training. However, the adverse effects were concentrated among workers in their early 
20s and not teenagers, the focus of our analysis. 
Several studies have linked work experiences while in high school to higher earnings 
later in life (Ruhm, 1997; Light, 2001; and Baum and Ruhm, 2016).  If the minimum wage 
reduces access to work during this period, it can lower future earnings as an adult, as found by 
Neumark and Nizalova (2007). The existence of a link between work during high school and 
lifetime earnings is consistent with human capital being acquired through the job. Indeed, Light 
(1998, 2001) found that working in high school was positively associated with returns to 
schooling, suggesting complementarities between skills acquired on the job and in school. 
Nevertheless, measuring the link between work in high school and future labor market success 
will be complicated by the role of unobserved ability (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2003; Lee 
and Orazem, 2010), a result of the fact that firms will have a greater incentive to train more able 
workers (Barron et al. 1989). 
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This existing work on minimum wages and investments in skill acquisition suggests 
several issues that must be considered when assessing the effects of minimum wages on training. 
First, firms in advanced economies invest considerable resources into training their workers 
(Bassanini et al., 2005). Virtually all jobs involve some training which typically occurs early in 
the employment relationship and at young ages (Barron et al., 1999). The intensity of training is 
related to both observed and unobserved ability. Minimum wages alter the incentives to invest in 
training the least-skilled and may sort out the least able while not affecting training for more able 
workers. Hence, analysis should focus on relatively less-skilled populations.  
Moreover, the minimum wage will also affect the types of jobs offered and ration the 
availability of those jobs.  For example, Aaronson and Phelan (2018) and Lordan and Neumark 
(2018) find that minimum wages reduce the number of automatable or cognitively repetitive jobs 
for low-skilled workers.  The changing number and distribution of jobs available to less-skilled 
workers will also affect their likelihood of receiving on-the-job training.  The next section 
provides a model that illustrates these issues. 
3. Theory 
Acemoglu and Pischke (2003) provide a hybrid model of on-the-job training that includes 
the Becker (1964) and Acemoglu Pischke (1999) models as special cases. The hybrid model will 
illustrate the conditions under which a minimum wage increase could increase or decrease firm 
provision of training. Suppose that workers’ natural abilities are continuously distributed 
𝐺𝐺[𝜂𝜂𝑚𝑚, 𝜂𝜂𝑚𝑚]. Workers supply labor inelastically over two periods in which the first period can also 
involve training. Training, 𝜏𝜏, is a dichotomous variable that, if undertaken, costs c in period 1. 
Trained workers produce added value 𝜑𝜑 > 𝑐𝑐 in period 2. Because the value of training outweighs 
its cost, training is socially desirable. A worker’s natural ability generates output 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 in period 2. 
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Workers are less productive in period 1 when they produce 𝜃𝜃𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, where 0 <  𝜃𝜃 < 1 such that 0 < 𝜃𝜃𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖. They gain additional skills attributable to tenure with the firm, 𝛿𝛿, which also 
raises worker output in period 2. While training raises a worker’s productivity in all firms, the 
gains in productivity resulting from job tenure only raise value in the incumbent firm. Hence, 𝛿𝛿 
represents match capital shared by the firm and the worker that limits incentives for the worker 
to leave. 
Firms have the same technologies and compete for workers so that economic profits are 
zero in equilibrium. The equilibrium wage and training is derived by backward induction. In 
period 2, workers are paid 
        𝑊𝑊2(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏 = 0) =  𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖   if they do not train in period 1 and (1A) 
 𝑊𝑊2(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏 = 1) =  𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑 if they do train in period 1. (1B) 
Case 1: Only firms can pay for training 
Firm profits from hiring the ith worker untrained or trained, respectively, are given by 
 Π(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏 = 0) = [𝜃𝜃𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 −𝑊𝑊1(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖)] + [𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿 −𝑊𝑊2(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏 = 0)] (2A) 
               Π(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏 = 1) = [𝜃𝜃𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 − 𝑐𝑐 −𝑊𝑊1(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖)] + [𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜑𝜑 −𝑊𝑊2(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏 = 1)] (2B) 
where 𝑊𝑊1 is the first period wage. Substituting in the wages and differencing, we have  
Π(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 , 𝜏𝜏 = 1) −  Π(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏 = 0) = −𝑐𝑐 which shows that firms cannot profit from providing training. 
Workers capture all the rewards from training because if the firm does not pay 𝜑𝜑 to the trained 
worker, the worker can obtain that offer from another firm. As a result, the firm sets 𝜏𝜏 = 0. First 
period wages are set so as to satisfy the zero profit condition at 𝜏𝜏 = 0: 
 𝑊𝑊1(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖) = 𝜃𝜃𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿. (3) 
In other words, anticipating the match-specific rent associated with tenure, firms bid up the wage 
in the first period up to the level that exactly equals the anticipated gain in the second period. 
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Case 2: Some workers can pay for training 
The equilibrium in case 1 is inefficient because training adds social value. Because the 
worker receives all the rewards from training, the firm has no incentive to invest in training. 
Suppose, however, that some fraction of workers 𝜆𝜆 ∈ [0,1] are able to contract with the firm to 
gain training. Following Becker (1964), they would do so by accepting a wage below their 
output in the training period and then reaping the reward in the second period. Second period 
wages would remain as given by (1A) and (1B), but first period wages would become 
 𝑊𝑊1(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏 = 0) =  𝜃𝜃𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿 (4A) 
for the 1 − 𝜆𝜆 proportion of workers who do not train and 
 𝑊𝑊1(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏 = 1) =  𝜃𝜃𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑐𝑐  (4B) 
for the 𝜆𝜆 proportion who do train.  
Without constraints on contracting, all workers would pay for training. Because firms 
neither gain nor lose from the training, however, they have no incentive to enter the training 
contract. So one reason that 𝜆𝜆 ≠ 1 is that some fraction of firms may not want to bother with the 
training provision. In addition, some workers may not be able to borrow against their anticipated 
future earnings due to credit constraints. Finally, the least skilled for whom 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 → 𝜂𝜂𝑚𝑚 may have 
training wages that are so low (or even negative) that they would be unable to meet their first 
period consumption requirements.  
Case 3: Binding Minimum Wage 
If a minimum wage is imposed such that 𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀 > 𝜂𝜂𝑚𝑚, period 2 wages will become 
𝑊𝑊2(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏 = 0) =  max {𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀, 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖} if the worker does not train in period 1 and (5A) 
𝑊𝑊2(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏 = 1) =  max {𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀, 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑} if the worker does train in period 1. (5B) 
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Some of the workers in the training group 𝜆𝜆 will no longer be able to pay for their training 
because the minimum wage will prevent them from taking a cut in pay. These workers will be 
drawn from the lower skilled groups such that 
 𝑊𝑊1(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖, 𝜏𝜏 = 1) =  𝜃𝜃𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿 − 𝑐𝑐 < 𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀, (6) 
so the fraction or workers self-financing their training will be 
 𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤 =  𝜆𝜆 �1 − 𝐺𝐺 �𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀−𝛿𝛿+𝑐𝑐
𝜃𝜃
��,     𝜕𝜕𝑇𝑇
𝑤𝑤
𝜕𝜕𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀
< 0. (7) 
As the minimum wage rises, the fraction of workers self-financing their education falls.  
On the other hand, the minimum wage will provide the firm an incentive to pay for the 
training of the least skilled workers in the (1 − 𝜆𝜆) group for whom the minimum wage condition 
(6) also binds. Within that group, consider the workers for whom 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀 − 𝑐𝑐. Because training 
is productive, 𝑐𝑐 < 𝜑𝜑 so there will be some workers whose untrained skills are below 𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀 − 𝑐𝑐 but 
who have skills worth more than 𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀 in period 2. This means that for some workers in the 1 − 𝜆𝜆 
group, the firm can profitably pay for training. The profitability condition for firms training 
workers whose first period wage is 𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀 is 
 (1 + 𝜃𝜃)𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿 + 𝜑𝜑 − 𝑐𝑐 −𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀 − max {𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑,𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀} ≥ 0. (8) 
The least these workers would be paid in period 2 is 𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀. Applying condition (8), the skill groups 
for workers who would receive training paid for by the firm under the minimum wage are  
 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 = (1 − 𝜆𝜆)max �0,𝐺𝐺(𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀 − 𝑐𝑐) − 𝐺𝐺 �2𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀+𝑐𝑐−𝛿𝛿−𝜑𝜑1+𝜃𝜃 ��. (9) 
For at least some values of the minimum wage, 𝑇𝑇𝑓𝑓 > 0, and so increases in the minimum wage 
can increase the fraction of workers receiving firm-financed training.  
 This theory illustrates that receipt of training paid for by the firm depends on a worker’s 
ability, with firms paying for the training only of the least skilled. More skilled workers will also 
receive training by the firm, but they pay for that training with a wage below their period 1 
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productivity. As the minimum wage rises, less training will be paid for by the workers but more 
training will be paid for by the firm over at least some range of the minimum wage. At some 
point, however, further increases in the minimum wage would render all training opportunities 
unprofitable, whether financed by the firm or the worker. 
The model illustrates that if the minimum wage has an effect on training, it will be 
concentrated among the least skilled workers. Our dataset incorporating the employment and 
training experiences of high school students fits the model’s focus on low skill workers very 
well.  
4. Data 
The theory suggests that minimum wages will alter the types of jobs offered by firms. 
Specifically, it will reduce the number of jobs that would allow the workers to self-finance their 
training, but it can increase the number of positions involving firm-financed training as a job 
attribute. Hence, the model suggests that we compare the mix of jobs associated with on-the-job 
training provided to less-skilled workers across places or time periods with relatively high or low 
minimum wages. 
We test the model using data from the March 2014 release of the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). The dataset contains 8,984 respondents who were between 12 
and 17 years of age during the first round of the survey in 1997. By 2014, respondents were aged 
29 – 34 which means that most were no longer in school and have relevant measures of early 
economic success.  The NLSY97 provides longitudinal data on each respondent’s work history, 
educational attainment, and earnings which will allow us to determine adult economic outcomes 
as a result of training access while in high school.   
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We focus on the training that respondents acquired while in high school. We depart from 
past studies by allocating training based on the individual’s occupation during that time. To 
define job skills acquired during high school, we need to designate which years belong to that 
period. This is straightforward for high school graduates, but not so for students who drop out of 
high school or attrite from the sample before graduation. Respondents who did not report a year 
of graduation were assigned a graduation year at their 18th birthday if they were born January 
through August, or at their 19th birthday if they were born September through December. Using 
the proxy for high school graduation year, a representative high school occupation was selected 
by choosing the job with the most hours worked in the year of graduation. If no job was reported 
during the graduation year, then the last year with a job was used. Respondents who did not work 
at any time within the four years preceding their graduation year are treated as not working in 
high school. Assigned graduation years range from 1997 to 2003. As described below, we link 
each individual’s Standard Occupation Classification for the high school job to the O*NET 
database of occupational information managed by the U.S. Department of Labor. The O*NET 
database includes detailed information on the importance of these skills associated with each job. 
Similarly, the job with the most hours reported during the most recent survey year was 
selected as the representative adult occupation. If the respondent did not work within the last 
year, the occupation with the most hours worked in the previous year was used. If there was no 
job worked within the last two years, the job with the most hours worked in the last three years 
was used. If there was no job worked in the past three survey years, the respondent was assumed 
not to be working.   
The choice of working while in high school is endogenous and will depend on 
unobservable and observable skills as described in the theory. Among other factors, high school 
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work will depend also on government policy regulating youth employment. We make use of the 
restricted Geocode supplement file that allows us to merge in measures of the strength of the 
local youth labor market at the time each individual was in high school.  During the period when 
respondents in our data attended high school, the federal minimum wage increased from $4.75 to 
$5.15 per hour. State minimum wages during that period varied considerably, with the highest 
being $6.90 in Washington state.   
Equations (7) and (9) indicate that the minimum wage effect depends on its level relative 
to the distribution of skills and the wage growth over the career.  In addition, while prices were 
not explicitly incorporated into the model, the effect of the same nominal minimum wage will 
depend on the local price level which will be reflected in area wages.  Therefore, in addition to 
using the minimum wage at the start and completion of the high school period, we include the 
ratio of the state minimum wage to the average county retail wage.  A higher ratio increases the 
likelihood that the minimum wage binds and limits the ability of workers to finance their training 
by accepting a lower wage. We complete our characterization of the strength of the local labor 
market with the local unemployment rate in 1998. 
The theory also requires that we control for the respondent’s natural ability 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖.  Our 
measure is the score on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery.  Other controls for 
unmeasured ability include the parents’ education and income that are assumed to correlate with 
their children’s skills through human capital transfers.  We also include a vector of demographic 
attributes.  
Because local governments may set minimum wages in part to reflect work attitudes and 
abilities of the local population, we consider additional sources of exogenous variation in labor 
supply decisions.  Lee and Orazem (2010) show that work in high school depends on the age at 
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which a student starts high school. This starting date is related to the month of birth because 
states set minimum ages of school entry. A complete summary of all variables used in the 
analysis appears in Appendix Table A1. 
Measuring occupational training while in high school 
The O*NET online database contains 277 job descriptors including typical tasks, 
technology, knowledge, skills, abilities, and work environment encountered. The job descriptors 
include detailed measures of skills required for performance in each of the 974 occupations 
including 10 indicators of basic skills, one complex problem solving skill, four resource 
management skills, six social skills, three system skills, and 11 technical skills.6 From these 35 
indicators, we selected 17 that were commonly present in the types of jobs performed by high 
school students in our database and that were also commonly found on jobs performed by young 
adults. Our 17 skill indicators included all the basic and complex problem solving categories and 
subsets of the skills in resource management, social, and systems categories. Technical skills 
were too narrowly focused on selected occupations and were excluded. Appendix Table A2 
provides a listing of the 17 included skills and brief descriptions.  
The O*NET dataset provides two skill measures: the level or mastery of the skill required 
for the job and the importance of the skill to performance of the job. In practice, the two 
measures generated similar results.  Nevertheless, we focused on the importance measure for this 
analysis because we are interested in measuring how doing the job involves practice applying 
these skills in the workplace. O*NET rates each skill on a scale from 1 (not important to the 
occupation) to 5 (extremely important to the occupation).   
                                                 
6 For details, see https://www.onetonline.org/find/descriptor/browse/Skills/. 
14 
 
We use principle components analysis (PCA) to generate weighted averages of the 17 
skills, where the first set of weights is the eigenvector that explains the greatest amount of the 
covariation among the 17 factors, the second explains the second most covariation, and so on. 
The results of the PCA are summarized in Table 1.  Following convention, we include all 
eigenvectors for which the associated eigenvalue is greater than 1. The first three principle 
components explained 79% of the covariation among the 17 factors. Among these, the first 
eigenvector explained 61% of the covariation. Since all of the skills entered with positive 
weights, we designated this component as the “level of general skills.” The second eigenvector 
explained 11% of the covariation among the 17 skill measures. The positive weights were all 
associated with interpersonal skills, and we label them accordingly. The third eigenvector 
explained 8% of the covariation, with positive weights attached to skills related to managerial 
talents. 
We performed a comparable analysis using the adult occupations. Only two eigenvectors 
had eigenvalues greater than 1. As with the youth aggregations, the first two were related to 
general skills and interpersonal skills, explaining 69% and 8%, respectively, of the covariation 
among adult occupations. 
5. Testing whether the minimum wage raises or lowers job training 
The theory shows not only that that the minimum wage can either increase or decrease 
training, but also that it may change the probability that a low-skill individual is employed. The 
same skills that affect the likelihood of being trained will affect the probability of finding a job. 
Because we observe training only for individuals who are employed, we ought to correct our 
training assessment for the nonrandom sorting of high school students into the labor market. We 
specify labor force participation while in high school as 
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 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 +  𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽𝑅𝑅 + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛽𝛽𝑍𝑍 +  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿  (10) 
where 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if student i in market j and time t 
worked while in high school, 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′  is a location specific measure of the rewards for participating in 
the labor force, 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 is the measure of the student’s ability, 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of regulations that can 
limit access to the labor market based on age, 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of household and demographic 
attributes, and 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿  captures unobserved influences on participation. Elements of the vector of 
rewards measures include the current county unemployment rate, the local minimum wage 
relative to the average wage in retail, and the prevailing local minimum wage in the first and last 
year of high school. Again, our measure of worker ability is the student’s score on the Armed 
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery. The regulatory measures include dummy variables for the 
month of birth and the year of birth, the state truancy age, and the measures of the relevant 
minimum wage during high school. The remaining variables are controls for parental education, 
race or ethnicity, gender, and census region. Results of a probit estimation of Equation (10) are 
reported in Table 2. 
The results show that higher minimum wages did not lower the probability of 
employment during high school. In fact, the coefficients suggest that high school students were 
more likely to work at some time during their four high school years in states with higher 
minimum wages, although the estimated effect is not statistically significant at standard 
significance levels. High school students were more likely to work in states that do not require 
attendance after age 16. High county unemployment rates lowered the probability of working. 
The most able, as measured by their Armed Services test score, were most likely to work.  
 There are significant differences in the probability of working depending on month of 
birth, with those born early in the year less likely to work and those born later in the year more 
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likely to work. The latter are more likely to be held back for school entry and so will start high 
school at an older age. Individuals in states with more restrictive truancy laws are less likely to 
work, as are youth in areas with higher unemployment rates.  
Do minimum wages raise or lower job training for high school students? 
Conditional on working, we can test the hybrid theory of Equations (7) and (9) that 
minimum wages may raise or lower training. Our selection process includes the vector of 
monthly date of birth dummy variables which we use to generate exogenous variation in the 
probability of working while in high school while assuming on-the-job training is not offered 
based on birth month.  Let 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘  be the k
th type of training undertaken by individual i in location j 
and year t. These measures are generated by the weighted sum of the occupational attributes as 
described in Table 1. We specify the equation 
 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 = 𝛾𝛾𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝜂𝜂𝑘𝑘𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍𝑘𝑘 + 𝛾𝛾𝜆𝜆𝑘𝑘𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇  (11) 
where 𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the minimum wage relative to the local retail wage, 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 is the measure of individual 
ability, 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the vector of demographic and household controls, and 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the selection 
correction based on Equation (10). We present the results for each of our three measures of 
training in Table 3. 
For each of our measures of training obtained on a job while in high school, the minimum 
wage relative to the local retail minimum wage significantly reduces training. This occurs even 
though high school students were no less likely to work in the high minimum wage states. The 
mechanism in our sample is that a higher minimum wage changes the type of jobs offered to 
high school graduates.  High school students in high minimum wage states are given jobs that 
involve less skill acquisition.  We report the magnitude of the minimum wage effect on training 
at the bottom of Table 3.  The decline in general skills is modest at -3.7%, but the decline in 
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interpersonal and managerial skills acquired on high school jobs as a result of higher minimum 
wages is much more substantial. 
In the model, higher ability workers are able to finance their training by accepting a lower 
wage in exchange for firm training as long as the minimum wage does not constrain the contract 
space.  Consistent with that hypothesis, the higher skilled students as measured by the Armed 
Services test were the most likely to work. Students whose parents were more educated and had 
higher incomes were also more likely to acquire general and interpersonal skills, consistent with 
the hypothesis if there is intergenerational transfer of human capital.  
The purpose of this section is to test whether higher minimum wages lowers training as 
predicted by the Becker (1964) model or raises firm training as predicted by Acemoglu and 
Pischke (1998, 1999).  The result of the test is clearly in favor of the Becker prediction.  Higher 
minimum wages lower all types of training: general, interpersonal and managerial. 
6.  Does job training in high school have persistent value? 
It remains to show that these training measures actually matter for lifetime labor market 
outcomes. Ruhm (1997), Light (2001) and Baum and Ruhm (2016) among others have shown 
that working in high school is positively correlated with favorable adult outcomes. The 
presumption is that high school work generates work-related skills that persist into adulthood. 
Table 3 shows that minimum wages reduce occupation-specific skill generation. Next, we 
illustrate that these skills acquired in high school can generate the long-term benefits such as 
later earnings previously associated with working while in high school.  Let 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛  be the n
th 
adult outcome T years after the expected high school graduation date. The adult outcomes 
include the skill content of the adult job, hourly wage and income earned as an adult, and 
whether or not the individual has a job as an adult. Our specification is 
 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛 =  ∑ 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘3𝑘𝑘=1 + 𝜓𝜓𝜂𝜂𝑛𝑛𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′ 𝜓𝜓𝑍𝑍𝑛𝑛 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴   (12) 
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where 𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 captures the effect of training while in high school on adult outcomes. If training 
obtained while in high school matters for lifetime earnings, employment, or adult skills, then 
𝜓𝜓𝑘𝑘 > 0 for that outcome.  
We report the estimated impacts of training while in high school on adult income, adult 
hourly pay, and adult job skills in Table 4.  Although the measures are not always individually 
significant, they are jointly significant in all cases.  General skills and managerial skills acquired 
in high school have persistent positive effects on adult incomes.  High school general skills also 
raise adult wages and employment prospects and the stock of general skills as an adult.  High 
school interpersonal skills only significantly raise adult interpersonal skills.  At the bottom of 
Table 4, we measure the percentage change in adult outcomes associated with high school 
acquired skills.  The wage and income effects are more modest than the ones found by Ruhm 
(1997), Light (2001) and Baum and Ruhm (2016), but they are not small.  Moreover, they show 
more directly that job skills earned in high school are related to permanent income gains as 
adults. 
We showed in Table 3 that minimum wages affect the types of jobs offered to high 
school graduates in that employers in high minimum wage states offer jobs with fewer required 
skills.  We can estimate the magnitude of he minimum wage effects on adult outcomes through 








𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 using the coefficients on training in Table 4 and the 
coefficient on minimum wages in Table 3.  The estimates reported at the bottom of Table 4 are 
quite small.  Lifetime income is only 0.1% lower on average due to lost job training in high 
school attributable to minimum wages.  This is not surprising.  Workers have a lifetime to make 
up for lost training opportunities while in high school with additional schooling and job training. 
Moreover, we are averaging the effects across all high school students, whether they work or not.  
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Our population estimates will be larger if we focus only on the directly affected population who 
worked while in high school. 
We can illustrate this point by dividing the sample into the group that did not go to 
college versus the group that completed at least a four-your college degree.  High school training 
will be most important for the 43% of the sample who did not gain any schooling beyond high 
school.  We report these results in Table 5.  The permanent effects of training on adult income 
and wages are concentrated on the group that stopped with the high school degree.  Hence, the 
long-term costs of the minimum wage are borne most by the least-educated who do not replace 
potential lost job training in high school with further schooling. 
7. Conclusion 
This study shows that job training in high school can have persistent favorable impacts on adult 
outcomes.  On average, skills acquired in high school jobs increased adult incomes by 7.5% and 
adult hourly wages by 16%.  These estimates are somewhat smaller than previously reported 
effects of working in high school on adult earnings, but they are large enough to suggest that on-
the-job training in high school is an important reason for the persistence in high school earnings 
later in life.   
We also provide evidence that minimum wages limit on-the-job training received in high 
school.  This is consistent with the predictions of Becker’s (1964) theory of firm-specific human 
capital but conflicts with the Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999) model that minimum wages 
could raise firm-sponsored training.  Nevertheless, our estimated effects of the minimum wage 
on lifetime earnings are small, mainly because students have plenty of time later in their careers 
to make up for any foregone opportunity to acquire human capital while in high school. 
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The estimated adverse effects of the minimum wage are largest for groups that did not go 
on to college. This finding is especially concerning in the context that the labor force 
participation rate of teens aged 16-19 declined to 35% in 2016 from 53% in the early 1990s and 
is projected to decline further to 32% by 2026.7 This drop in teen labor market activity is much 
larger than the increase in time spent in school, so these changes are primarily due to changes in 
time use away from school. While increased time spent in extracurricular activities such as 
sports, school-related functions, and other productive uses of time can also augment a teen’s skill 
development, decreasing time spent in work while in school could affect long-term future 
earnings, particularly among those not going on to college.  
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(N = 7,987) 
Adult 
(N = 7,162) 
 1 2 3 1 2 
Skill* General Interpersonal Managerial General Interpersonal 
Critical 
Thinking 0.246 -0.294 -0.016 0.260 -0.242 
Time 








0.238 -0.261 -0.293 0.249 -0.249 
Monitoring 0.229 -0.220 -0.084 0.243 -0.127 




0.230 -0.197 0.336 0.238 -0.183 
Reading 
Comprehension 0.250 -0.124 -0.026 0.249 -0.154 
Writing 0.264 -0.119 0.043 0.255 -0.122 
Mathematics 0.126 0.159 0.774 0.151 -0.196 
Speaking 0.268 0.258 -0.110 0.261 0.216 
Persuasion 0.245 0.320 -0.163 0.238 0.307 
Negotiation 0.259 0.226 0.051 0.249 0.216 
Social 
Perceptiveness 0.255 0.263 -0.182 0.241 0.334 
Service 
Orientation 0.208 0.449 0.062 0.178 0.566 
Active 
Listening 0.261 0.276 -0.047 0.258 0.200 
Active Learning 0.279 -0.106 0.030 0.268 -0.115 
Eigenvalue: 10.4 1.93 1.16 11.7 1.42 
Proportion of 
Covariance  61.1% 11.3% 6.8% 69.1% 8.4% 
Cumulative 
Proportion 61.1% 72.4% 79.2% 69.1% 77.5% 
 




Table 2. Probit estimation of the probability of working at any time while in high school 
 
Variable Name Marginal Effects (Std. Err.) 
Elasticities 





Minimum Wage first year of High School -0.026 (0.0559) 
-0.0289 
(0.062) 
Minimum Wage last year of High School 0.116 (0.101) 
0.115 
(0.0999) 
Residing in a state that requires students to be 





Residing in a state that requires students to be 




































Male  -0.0119 (0.0367) 
-0.0037 
(0.0114) 
Joint test of minimum wage effects 𝜒𝜒2(3) 5.56  
N 8,842  
Pseudo R2 .058  
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
Includes controls for missing values for parental income and education and missing Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery, and controls for race and region of the country.  
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Table 3. Selection bias corrected estimates of the impacts of the minimum wage and demographics on the 


























Residing in a state that requires students to be 







Residing in a state that requires students to be 



















































Minimum wage effect at sample means -3.8% -73.0% -10.6% 
N 8,842 8,842 8,842 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10 
Includes controls for missing values for parental income and education and missing Armed Services Vocational 




Table 4. Estimated impacts of youth-acquired job skills on adult outcomes 



























































































































Observations 6,247 6,276 7,987 7,987 7,987 
R2 0.087 0.095 0.17 0.18 0.11 
Joint Significance 
high school skills 8.17
** 10.9** 8.57** 4.46** 7.83** 
Joint effect of 
high school skills 
(%) 
7.5% 16.0% 12.9% 62.5% 25.8% 
Minimum wage 
effect at sample 
means (%) 
-0.1% 0.0% -0.8% -3.8% -6.1% 
 
Standard errors in parentheses.  ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.  Pseudo-R2 is reported for the limited dependent variable 
equation on labor force participation. 
Regressions include all variables specified in Table 3.
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ln(adult hourly pay) 
Probability of  
Working as an Adult 
Adult 
 General Skills 
Adult 
 Interpersonal Skills 
 






































































2,470 1,933 2,471 1,934 3,291 2,133 3,291 2,133 3,291 2,133 
R2  
0.091 0.055 0.079 0.051 0.186 0.178 0.196 0.124 0.146 0.072 
Joint significance 
of high school 
skills 
3.72** 0.61 3.49** 1.23 0.04 2.18 0.20 0.87 4.48** 0.37 
   
Standard errors in parentheses.  ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.  Pseudo-R2 is reported for the limited dependent variable equation on labor force participation. 






Table A1. Variable names and descriptions 
 
Variable Name Description 
ln(AdultOccInc) Natural log of the total income from the chosen adult occupation. Total 
income from the occupation calculated by multiplying total hours by hourly 
pay. 
ln(HrlyPayAdult) Natural log of the hourly pay from the chosen adult occupation. 
Minimum Wage The local minimum wage the first year of high school 
Relative Minimum 
Wage 
The ratio of the state minimum wage to the average retail compensation by 
county 
Not Truant at 17 States that require students to remain enrolled until age 17 
Not Truant at 18 States that require students to remain enrolled until age 18 
Male 1 if male 
AdultAge Age of adult during survey the year from which adult occupation was chosen. 
Found by subtracting birth year from survey year. 
(AdultAge)2 (AdultAge)x(AdultAge) 
dNoWorkHS 1 if did not work in high school (determined to have worked if had positive 
high school occupation code) 
WorkAdult 1 if work as adult (determined as working if have positive adult occupation 
code) 
dUrbanHS 1 if lived in an urban area during survey from which high school occupation 
was chosen 
dNEHS 1 if lived in the northeast during survey from which high school occupation 
was chosen 
dSouthHS 1 if lived in the south during survey from which high school occupation was 
chosen 
dWestHS 1 if lived in the west during survey from which high school occupation was 
chosen 
dGED 1 if highest degree received is a GED 
dHS 1 if highest degree received is a high school diploma (regular 12 year 
program) 
dAssoc 1 if highest degree received is from associate/junior college (AA) 
dBach 1 if highest degree received is a bachelor’s degree (BA, BS) 
dMaster 1 if highest degree received is a master’s degree (MA, MS) 
dPhD 1 if highest degree received is a PhD 
dPro 1 if highest degree received is a professional degree (DDS, JD, MD) 
dBlack 1 if race/ethnicity is black 
dHispanic 1 if race/ethnicity is Hispanic 
dNBNH 1 if race/ethnicity is non-black, non-Hispanic 
TtlHrsHS Total hours worked at chosen high school job. Found by multiplying hours 
per week by total number of weeks worked. 
CumulativeHrsHS Cumulative hours worked during high school/teen years 
HighestParentHGC Highest grade completed by either biological parent 





Table A1, continued. Variable names and descriptions 
 
Variable Name Description 
GrossHHIncHS Gross household income reported in survey from which high school 
occupation was chosen 
dHHIncHSMissing 1 if missing information for gross household income during high 
school 
ASVAB Percentile score on ASVAB 
dASVABMissing 1 if missing value for ASVAB percentile 
HS importance rating of 
General Work Experience 
The created skills variable from component 1 of the principal 
component analysis on the importance ratings of the chosen skills, 
high school job. 
HS importance rating of 
Interpersonal Skills 
The created skills variable from component two of the principal 
component analysis on the importance ratings of the chosen skills, 
high school job. 
HS importance rating of 
Managerial Skills 
The created skills variable from component three of the principal 
component analysis on the importance ratings of the chosen skills, 
high school job. 
HS level rating of General 
Work Experience 
The created skills variable from component 1 of the principal 
component analysis on the level ratings of the chosen skills, high 
school job. 
HS level rating of Managerial 
Skills 
The created skills variable from component two of the principal 
component analysis on the level ratings of the chosen skills, high 
school job. 
Adult importance rating of 
General Work Experience 
The created skills variable from component 1 of the principal 
component analysis on the importance ratings of the chosen skills, 
adult job. 
Adult importance rating of 
Interpersonal Skills 
The created skills variable from component 2 of the principal 
component analysis on the importance ratings of the chosen skills, 
adult job. 
Adult level rating of General 
Work Experience 
The created skills variable from component 1 of the principal 




Table A2. Descriptions and abbreviations for chosen skills. Descriptions come directly from the O*NET 
database 
Skill Abbr. Description* 
Critical Thinking CT Using logic and reasoning to identify the strengths and weaknesses of alternative solutions, conclusions or approaches to problems. 
Time Management TM Managing one's own time and the time of others. 
Judgment and 
Decision Making JDM 
Considering the relative costs and benefits of potential actions to 
choose the most appropriate one. 
Active Listening ALST 
Giving full attention to what other people are saying, taking time to 
understand the points being made, asking questions as appropriate, and 
not interrupting at inappropriate times. 
Active Learning ALRN Understanding the implications of new information for both current and future problem-solving and decision-making. 
Complex Problem 
Solving CPS 
Identifying complex problems and reviewing related information to 
develop and evaluate options and implement solutions. 
Speaking S Talking to others to convey information effectively. 
Monitoring M Monitoring/Assessing performance of yourself, other individuals, or organizations to make improvements or take corrective action. 
Reading 
Comprehension RC 
Understanding written sentences and paragraphs in work related 
documents. 
Coordination C Adjusting actions in relation to others' actions. 
Persuasion P Persuading others to change their minds or behavior. 
Negotiation N Bringing others together and trying to reconcile differences. 
Writing W Communicating effectively in writing as appropriate for the needs of the audience. 
Mathematics MTH Using mathematics to solve problems. 
Social 
Perceptiveness SP 
Being aware of others' reactions and understanding why they react as 
they do. 
Service Orientation SO Actively looking for ways to help people. 
Management of 
Personnel Resources MPR 
Motivating, developing, and directing people as they work, identifying 
the best people for the job. 
 
*Descriptions from http://www.onetonline.org/find/descriptor/browse/Skills/.   
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Table A3. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Adult importance rating of interpersonal skills 8,984 0.393 0.708 -1.24 2.90 
Adult importance rating of general skills 8,984 6.18 13.0 -45.0 17.0 
Hourly Adult Wage in chosen occupation 
(natural log) 6,892 2.64 0.697 -4.60 9.32 
Annual Adult Wage in chosen occupation 
(natural log) 6,856 10.9 1.62 2.13 19.6 
Probability of Working as an Adult 8,984 0.786 0.410 0.000 1.00 
Adult importance rating of general skills 8,984 6.18 13.0 -45.0 17.0 
High school importance rating of general skills 7,987 11.5 1.27 8.48 16.2 
High school importance rating of interpersonal 
skills 
7,987 0.537 0.6012 -1.16 2.47 
High school importance rating of managerial 
skills 
7,987 0.504 0.537 -0.875 1.81 
Male  8,984 0.512 0.500 0.000 1.00 
Adult Age 8,984 28.4 1.61 25.0 31.0 
Adult Age Squared 8,984 811 91.4 625 961 
High School in Northeastern Census Region 8,984 0.170 0.376 0.000 1.000 
High School in Southern Census Region 8,984 0.376 0.484 0.000 1.000 
High School in Western Census Region 8,984 0.219 0.414 0.000 1.000 
Race Ethnicity Black  8,984 0.260 0.439 0.000 1.000 
Race Ethnicity Hispanic  8,984 0.212 0.409 0.000 1.000 
Highest grade completed by either biological 
parent 
8,984 12.3 5.38 -4.00 95.0 
Parents' Gross Household Income  
(10 thousands) 
8,984 2.93 4.99 -0.001 42.6 
ASVAB percentile 8,984 0.358 0.318 0.000 1.000 
Missing ASVAB value  8,984 0.210 0.408 0.000 1.000 
Missing value for parent's highest grade 
completed  
8,984 0.053 0.225 0.000 1.000 
Missing value for gross household income 8,984 0.458 0.498 0.000 1.000 
Cumulative hours worked during high 
school/teen years 
8,984 2.96 2.20 0.000 8.000 
Total hours worked at chosen high school job. 
Found by multiplying hours per week by total 
number of weeks worked. 
8,984 1.06 1.23 0.000 6.500 
Years of Education 8,364 13.3 2.91 5.00 20.0 
 
